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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: A LIBERAL
LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS
DAVID

M. BEATTY*

"I am free . . . when my existence depends on myself."
F. Hegel

Philosophy of History (17)
"Some security is essential if freedom is to be preserved ...
F. Hayek
The Road to Serfdom (133)
I.

INTRODUCTION

I have been struck by the revival which liberalism seems to be
experiencing in the academic press of North America. Obviously it
(or, more properly, one of its competing versions) has never moved
very far off center stage; yet at least since the publication of John
Rawl's A Theory of Justice, it seems that the liberal, or liberaldemocratic, theory of law has enjoyed new respectability and critical
attention among our academic communities. I have found this renewed
interest, particularly that dealing with the normative, legislative-justice
side of this general legal theory, to be especially stimulating in so
far as it induces one to trace the effect of the logic of its constitutive
principles upon those social institutions which make up the basic structure of our society.
It is in that spirit that this essay is written. My object is to
trace out the skeletal features of a legal theory of employment relations, which would regulate and coordinate the interests of individuals
in their work relationships in a way which is derived from and consistent with the basic premises which are taken to be characteristic
of all liberal democratic' theories of law. The idea is to apply to the
predominant social relationship within which each of us exercises our
labour, the same legal principles and theories of law-making (viz,
legislating), as govern the other major social institutions in which we
coordinate and regulate other aspects of our lives. With the core prin-

* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
1. Although it may not always have been so, certainly for most contemporary
adherents of this theory, the basic ethical postulate of the liberal tradition seems
logically to entail a democratic law-making process. See C. MACPHERSON, THE
REALWORLD OF DEMOCRACY 9 (1966). See also A. GUTTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980).
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ciples of legislative justice and legitimacy, which unify all of the
various versions of what we espouse to be our governing legal theory,
we should be able to sense the broad framework, the most basic
substantive and procedural principles, which should characterize and
presumably make distinct such a 'liberal' law of our labour relationships. Deducing the basic structure of such a liberal law of employment relations from "first (viz. foundational) principles" ought to permit us to assess the extent to which our own contemporary schemes
which regulate the work relationship are compatible and consistent
with this general theory of law.
The development of the essay is in three parts. In the first, I
will identify what I take to be the basic ethical premise, the liberal
theory of right, which characterizes all contemporary versions of this
general legal tradition, and will show how it connects with the
processes by which law is made in the liberal society. My objective
here is purely descriptive. I begin by introducing what is, for liberals,
the essential normative idea that in our common capacities to
experience pleasure and pain, to pursue our own interests, to be the
author of our own plans for our lives, etc., every individual must be
taken to be the equal of every other member of the society and is
entitled, in these aspects of one's existence, to an equal respect. That
idea of our moral equality is the most fundamental ethical postulate
in liberal theory. I shall refer to this basic premise as the equal right
of individual autonomy or liberty. It is an entitlement to an equal
opportunity of personal freedom, to personal self-government.
Next I describe how this basic assumption has influenced and
permeated the processes and institutions by which law is made in
a liberal society. Here I am concerned with emphasizing how liberal
theory has relied (interalia)on a set of basic civil and political rights
to give effect to its assumption about the equality between individuals,
by shaping the structure and constraining the output of society's lawmaking (viz, legislative) processes. By enshrining personal liberties
or freedoms in the liberal tradition of law, civil, legal and political
rights are intended to ensure that the autonomy of every individual
receives some basic equality of respect. Limits and checks are imposed
upon the legislative institutions in which society settles the rules in
accordance with which individuals must coordinate their competing
and often conflicting ambitions and aspirations. At least since taking
on a democratic dimension, the crucial idea in the liberal conception
of legislative justice is that its basic ethical assumption of the equal
right of each individual to control the most basic choices in his life
can most effectively be established by ensuring that the procedural
principles which govern the major legislative (viz, law-making) institu-
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tions in society, are themselves consistent with and give effect to our
equality as moral agents.
From this understanding of the general method of legislative
justice in the liberal tradition of law, in the second part of the essay, I
endeavor to derive the broad features of a liberal law of labour relations. After establishing why this theory of rights and conception of
law-making is relevant to the rules governing our work relationships,
the idea is to endeavor to deduce the first principles, the basic structure or framework, of a law of labour relations which is concerned,
in the first instance, in ensuring that every person in the society is
equally free from (what for liberals is the potentially arbitrary and
coercive) interference by others in the development of this central,
productive aspect of their lives. Here, my object is to identify the
rights, liberties, conditions of labour which are essential to securing the autonomy of every individual. Two broad sets of entitlements
of industrial citizenship seem to suggest themselves as natural and
integral features of such a liberal law of labour relations. Paralleling
the general theory's characteristic reliance on civil and political liberties, I argue that one set of rights would, by imposing limits on the
subordinate law-making processes which actually settled the law (terms
and conditions) of employment, endeavor to secure that degree of
material well-being which is essential to the autonomy of the individual. The second set, by recognizing a right to participate fairly
(viz. as an equal) in the subordinate law-making processes, would ensure that, beyond a basic equality of independence, in settling the
actual terms and conditions of work each person's aspirations are given an
equal consideration. The first set of rights, which guarantee some basic
entitlement to tenure and economic well-being, would bear directly
on how such a law of labour relations would resolve such contemporary work-related issues as redundancies, termination for cause, compulsory retirement, and guaranteed incomes. The second set of
'political' rights, including rights of due process, would settle the basis
on which, within those prior constraints, each person would participate
in the processes which settled the actual terms and conditions under
which they would be obliged to pursue their ambitions as producers.
Together, such rights (to procedural justice as it were) would be the
means by which a liberal law of labour relations would particularize
and concretize the set of economic entitlements which are regarded
as necessary to ensuring a basic equality of autonomy for every
member of the society.
In the third part of this essay, I endeavor to draw some practical conclusions about our own laws of employment. By assessing the
basic structure and first principles of our own systems of individual
and collective bargaining, I propose to test the intensity of our comProduced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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mitment to the basic moral assumption which drives our governing
theory of law. My conclusion is that set against the theory and techniques of procedural fairness within the liberal theory of law, the current institutions and principles we have enacted to govern our labour
relationships seem seriously deficient both in their failure to provide
substantial constraints against the tyranny that is the potential of
any law-making process,2 and in their reliance on a technique of lawmaking in which individual participation is both unequal and incomplete. In each of these failings, alternate principles, policies and
structures are suggested which our own policy makers ought to consider in their effort to liberalize this basic social institution within
which most of us must pursue and realize our ambitions as producers.
Before I set off in search of the basic principles of a liberal law
of labour or work relations, a preliminary matter warrants attention.
It is important to acknowledge that the liberal theory of legislative
legitimacy, and more particularly that aspect of it which requires lawmaking institutions to show an equal respect for the liberty of each
of its citizens, is certainly not the only criterion against which systems
of labour regulations might be erected or assessed. Plainly, there are
a host of other criteria against which schemes of labour relations could
be assayed. Thus, even within the liberal tradition itself, principles
of utility or distributive justice ultimately must be reconciled with
the fundamental ideal of moral equality that liberalism adopts as its
basic standard of legislative legitimacy. Wealth maximization, which
is the exclusive basis on which classical economic labour market
analysis rates competing schemes of labour relations, offers itself as
another available standard of comparison.'
It is not my intention in this essay to balance these or indeed
any other criteria of social justice. I do not try to work through a
full statement of the liberal law of employment complete with a set
of priority rules to reconcile the pluralist principles of legislative

2.

J. FISHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY (1979).

3. While for many the different ethical starting points around which one
might organize a law of labour relations compete and ultimately conflict with each
other, there are others for whom such a trade-off is not implied. For example, some
have made the argument that a right to some measure of economic security and material
well being, in particular, and workplace democracy more generally, could be derived
from and supportive of either a liberal or wealth maximization postulate. See, e.g.,
L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980). See also P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION (1969); J. VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOUR
MANAGED MARKETS ECONOMICS (1970); F. STEPHEN, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LABOUR
MANAGED FIRM (1982); J. MOORE, GROWTH WITH SELF MANAGEMENT (1980).
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justice that seem implicit in a comprehensive version of this theory
of law. Rather, I simply want to test, on its own terms-and indeed
on its most cautious and conservative interpretations -what laws or
institutions of employment a liberal theory of law entails and how
favorably our own model of labour relations compares. I want to derive
only the most basic, the "first" principles, the essential framework,
the minimum conditions as it were, of a liberal law of labour relations and understand how well they are expressed in our mixed system
of public standards and individual and collective bargaining.
While such a limited objective necessarily narrows the lessons
to be drawn from this essay, nevertheless, it does not, I trust, reduce
it to trivial proportions. For those who operate within the liberal tradition, consideration of the principles and legislative programs which
can legitimately be derived from the premise of our equality as
autonomous producers, will identify necessary, if incomplete, features
of a liberal law of labour relations. It will allow us to identify a set
of basic entitlements which, as guarantors of the conditions which are
essential to the independence and autonomy of virtually all persons
in an industrial society, will be conceptually prior to any competing
claims, for example of property owners, which would be expected to
be involved in a more comprehensive description of the liberal law
of employment. Once the liberal makes the assumption that equality
of liberty is the organizing principle of her theory of justice, property rights, just like all of our fundamental freedoms, are understood
to be derivative of and instrumental to the realization of that more
fundamental value. Like the "Lockean proviso," rights in and principles of employment which are essential to the autonomy and liberty of the individual would constrain and logically precede whatever
powers and privileges property could be defined to entail.' At least
for those operating within the liberal tradition, the exercise of deriving the first principles a liberal law of employment should permit
the identification of those economic entitlements which parallel our
civil and political liberties and which are immune to what others have
characterized as "the big trade-off."
II.

The Liberal Idea Of Law

The ultimate purpose of this essay is to assess the degree to
which our own system of employment regulation coincides with our
governing theory of law. Our first task then is to specify exactly what
are the ethical premises which distinguish this legal theory from its

4.

L.

BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS
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rivals, and how they will, at least in broad outline, determine the
framework within which the labour relationship will be organized.
There are a variety of competing legal theories which might be
said to fall within the liberal tradition.' But this diversity notwithstanding, there is also a good deal of common ground at the base
of the tradition which all liberals have come to share. Rooted in the
normative, and more particularly the legislative part of this theory
of law, is a set of common assumptions as to the basic starting point,
the methodological perspective if you will, that one ought to adopt
when confronting the most basic questions of social organization such
as: the circumstances under which a society can legitimately make
law to regulate (coordinate, interfere with, - as you please) the affairs
and ambitions of its members; who can make such law; by what
processes; and what kind of law it may ultimately be.
In addressing these fundamental issues of how individuals
interact with each other in their societies, all liberal theories begin
by adopting an ethical posture which distinguishes them from a whole
range of competing legal theories about the purposes, legitimacy, and
justice of social regulation. Reduced to its simplest terms, the liberal
theory of social organization begins with the almost tautological assertion that regardless of our individual talents and merits, no matter
the distinctiveness of our persons and personalities, as individuals we
share, because of our humanity, a will, power, or a personality, which
makes us desirous and capable of organizing and directing our own
lives. In arranging the basic structures of social organization, liberal
democrats cannot be distracted from the idea that each of us, as
rational, sentient beings, has a capacity for, and an interest in,
endeavoring to accomplish a set of life plans which we choose for
ourselves. Individuals are taken to have an equal interest in viewing
themselves as independent moral agents and not being identified with
any predetermined set of ends. This intrinsic equality of every human
being is what all liberals raise as the essential moral assumption for
their theories of law.' In the societal coordination of the competing
interests of individuals in a liberal community, the basic starting point
is the individual and her equal freedom to pursue whatever goal she
chooses. No matter whether her plan puts primary emphasis on
acquisition and consumption or exertion and development, as long as

5.

Helpful descriptions of the major strands of liberal democratic theory can

be found in C. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIME oF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977); GUTT.
MAN, supra note 1.

6.

A. GUTTMAN, supra note 1.
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the individual recognizes an equal, reciprocal right in every other
member of her society, the liberal tradition of law assumes, in erecting
the institutions within which individuals settle the rules on which they
must select and pursue their plans, that each person ought to be
equally free in making those basic choices for themselves. Because
everyone is assumed to have an interest in deciding what to do with
their lives and doing it without (the coercive) interference of others,
liberal policy makers, and the law they propose, endeavor to ensure
that everyone is equally free to ignore those who claim to have some
privileged access to the truth and the light, to the "right" way to
live out one's life. If the cornerstone of the liberal edifice is individual
choice, the task of the liberal law maker is to secure and cement the
independence which is recognized as being a precondition to these
acts of choosing.
In liberal theory it is this basic idea which is raised to constrain
the imperialistic inclinations of some to meddle in the lives of others
by any means. Liberal democrats refuse, except by force of rational
appeal (by neutral dialogue as Bruce Ackerman nicely calls it'), to
impose their choices on the rest of society. The basic liberty of each
individual which guarantees personal autonomy serves as protection
against the potential tyranny and aggression of others, whether their
interference is attempted by physical or legislative means. With
respect to the latter, viz, the processes and institutions through which
society enacts its laws, this basic constraint has been played out in
the tradition's first principles of legislative justice. In fact, two different techniques are utilized to ensure that the inviolability of an
individual's autonomy is secure from legislative intervention. By one
set of principles, limits are imposed on the reach of legitimate lawmaking; while by the other, principles of participation are adopted
which ensure the integrity of the output which will eventually be
enacted. Manifested as part of its theory of legislative justice, the
basic ethical postulate of the liberal tradition requires that the
legislative output, as well as the law-making processes through which
those laws are enacted, respect the intrinsic equality of every
individual to control the most basic choices about how she will go
about living her life. In the liberal tradition of law, rights are legal
devices which are intended to ensure that the law-making processes
and the legislation they produce will respect a basic equality of liberty
between all members of the society.
As liberal theories evolved, it was the latter, the limits on the

7.

B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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reach of legitimate law-making, which was the initial focus of attention for many liberals concerned with principles of legislative justice.
As the theory developed, a set of basic liberties which were regarded
as essential to the condition of being autonomous and independent,
of choosing how to experience life, came to be recognized by liberal
theorists as the inviolable right of every member of the liberal society.
These are our traditional legal and civil rights. Thus, freedom of our
physical persons and of our thoughts were among the first subjects
of justice which distinguished this tradition of law. These rights, which
have since become the hallmark of the liberal democratic societies
were, and remain, legal constructs by which the physical and intellectual independence which was regarded as essential for a person's
autonomy were guaranteed. The traditional rights of our physical persons against arbitrary detention, inhuman treatment, servitude, etc.,
together with the fundamental freedoms over one's thoughts and
beliefs were devised and are intended to ensure that on these matters,
which are so essential to our autonomy, there could be no case for
social interference. Civil and legal rights, in the liberal democratic
theory of law, act as controls, as trumps over the output of the
legislative process, and by doing so they ensure each individual in
the society will be independent of authoritative and ultimately coercive choices that others in society might otherwise make for them.
In the liberal tradition of law, civil and legal rights are legal devices
which require that all of society's law-making institutions, sovereign
or subordinate, parliamentary or regulatory, respect an equal opportunity in every individual to the autonomous control of their thoughts
and persons.
But to show an equal respect for the independence of each
individual's own personal existence, it is not sufficient, as many of
the earliest liberal democrats came to realize, to rely exclusively on
controls or checks against the potentially coercive influence of the
law-making process. Whether as a matter of empirical observation of
the legal and social condition of those who, except for their civil liberties, were excluded from participating in the legislative process,8 or
as a matter of the internal logic of their own ethical assumptions,9
liberal theorists soon came to require that the basic ethical postulate
of equality of individual liberty be recognized in and protected by
8. The rules of employment that were imposed on Sissy Jupe and her sisters
and brothers, by a legislative process in which they had no standing, is perhaps the

most dramatic piece of evidence of how an undemocratic, or more generally procedurally
unfair, law-making process can undermine and ultimately destroy our civil rights. See

C.

DICKENS, HARD TIMES

9.

C. B.

(1854).

MACPHERSON. supra,
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a correlative equality to participate in the law-making process. Unless
the theory recognized some equality in our political rights, our equality
as autonomous agents could be reduced to a pure formality. Equality
of liberty could only be guaranteed by ensuring that every individual
had an equal opportunity to participate in the institutions and
processes which determined the rules according to which their competing ambitions and aspirations must be formulated and pursued. If
individuals were equal in their capacity to experience pleasure and
pain, in their ability to rationally determine their own life plans, etc.,
then for most liberals logic required, the recognition of rights and principles of procedure which guarantee an equal opportunity to participate
in the formulation of the rules to which each of their pursuits would
have to conform.
The logic of deriving our most basic political rights, and in particular the democratic franchise, from the ethical postulate of equality
of liberty, was driven, in part, by the explicit assumption that liberal
democratic societies exist in a world in which resources are scarce
and in which individual plans are highly pluralistic and indefinitely
in conflict, at least insofar as they make claims on the society's
resources. Liberals assume we will never have enough to satisfy our
wants and we will always have quite different conceptions of the
"good" life. For most theorists, those empirical assumptions eventually have meant that some process or institution of law-making was
indispensable for the organization of society and that the only certain way that everyone's interest, including their primary interest in
the autonomous control of their lives, would be given respect and consideration, was to ensure their equal status and opportunity to participate in the process which settled the rules on which their competing ambitions would be resolved. Acceptance of the idea that in
certain fundamental respects we are equals as moral and rational beings has for most liberals meant an equal representation in the procedure that settles the terms of social cooperation.'0 From the principle of equality of liberty, liberalism metamorphosed naturally into a
democratic state.
To summarize, the first principles of social justice in a liberal
democratic theory of law endeavor to serve the ethical, pluralist,
assumption which drives the system in two ways. First, with respect
to the conditions which are essential to choosing a life-style for oneself,
(independence of thought, freedom of person, etc.) one set of liberties, in the form of individual rights, establishes almost impenetrable
10.

For example, see Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77

NAL OF PHILOSOPHY 515 (1980).
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barriers against virtually all interference by a society's legislative
processes. Second, in those processes and institutions in which the
rules of social cooperation to which the life plans of everyone must
conform are settled, these rights manifest themselves as principles
of procedural equality. Taken together, these political, civil and legal
rights are the primary legal devices employed by liberal theory to
achieve its ethical objective of respecting an equal space within which
each individual is entitled to maintain control over her personal life.
They represent the minimal legal framework which is necessary to
ensure that the natural predispositions of some respect the basic
autonomy of others.
III.

A LIBERAL LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS

To construct a legal institution to govern our labour relationships around these first principles of legislative justice would seem
to be a reasonably straightforward exercise. Essentially, the task will
be to articulate a set of principles which will act as limits upon and
guarantees of participation within the law-making processes which are
utilized to settle the actual terms and conditions (the law) under which
people work. Each of these techniques of legislative justice would be
infused in the law-making processes which regulate the labour relationship so as to allow us to derive constitutional rights of labour
which would be compatible with, and derived from the liberal theory
of what is right or legitimate in law.
Before we undertake such an assessment, it may be thought
necessary to establish the legitimacy of this application of moral
reasoning. That is to say we must be satisfied that the labour relationship is an appropriate subject of justice. Before we seek to detail
the substance and structure of liberal rights of labour and use them
as the criteria by which to measure contemporary systems of labour
relations, we must first have in hand an affirmative answer to the
question of whether there are any rights of that kind which are so
basic to the autonomy of the individual that they must be enshrined
in a constitutional Charter of Rights. Thus, as a preliminary matter,
we must address the question of whether there are any rights of
labour as basic to the liberty of our physical and spiritual selves as
our traditional civil and legal liberties such as freedom of speech and
security of the person.
In contemporary industrial societies it would seem that some kind
of right to labour and material well-being, a right to economic security,
is as basic to individuals' maintenance of "the final authority to con-

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/3

Beatty: Industrial Democracy: A Liberal Law of Labour Relations
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

1984]

trol their own lives"" as any of our more long-standing civil, political
and legal rights. Certainly, the labour relationship is central in the
life plans of virtually every member of any contemporary industrial
society. It is not a peripheral relationship or social institution. To the
contrary, in Rawlsian terms the labour relationship seems firmly
cemented in the foundation of the basic structure of all industrial
societies." In the institutions in which we exercise our labour, we take
care of and give expression to the most basic aspects of our humanity.
By our labour we effectively settle our identities as producers and
identify many of those with whom we develop our most personal
attachments.' 3 With respect to the former, for most of us it is almost
entirely a result of our labours that we are able to acquire the satisfactions and utilities which are central to all but the most monastic
lifestyles. From subsistence needs to frivolous extravagances, to the
socially scarce "positional goods""' which are so influential in the kind
of life most enjoy, whether we will be able to satisfy our consumptive choices is determined largely by means of how (or whether) we
exercise our labour. And, of course, in addition to serving such consumptive purposes, it is in our labour relationships that we act out
our most basic instincts to exert and develop our natural capacities.
By our labour, as in our speech, we give direct expression to our identities as we conceive of them. We demonstrate who we are and what
we think is a worthwhile application of our talents. For almost
everyone who lives in an industrial society, it is a fact of their human
condition that to an unparalleled degree they are sustained by and
identified with what they produce, and what they do productively with
their lives is settled largely by the legal institutions and the legislative
processes which regulate their labour relationships. Employment has
become for the industrial society what commons land was to its feudal
predecessor. It is the social institution through which we pursue virtually every ambition we have to be productive.
With such a strategic position in the basic structure of an
industrial society, the connections between the employment relationship and the autonomy of the individual would be expected to be deep
and diverse. Thus, just as a matter of logical entailment, some sort
11.

This is the characterization of the basic ethical postulate of the liberal

theory used in Richards, Rights and Autonomy, 92 ETHICS 3 (1981).
12.

J. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971).

13. In Durkheim's terms, in an industrial society, work and employment are
two of the primary legal artifacts through which "organic solidarity" is furthered. See
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY (1965); M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND
THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).

14.

See F. HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1978).
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of a right to labour, guaranteeing some level of material well being,
seems to be essential to the liberal ideal of equality of liberty, of each
person having the legal authority to maintain control over her life.
If, as some argue, a right to life can be implied in or derived from
the liberal premise of a person's right to pursue her interests,'5 then
simply as a matter of logical deduction, some right to economic
security would have to be a condition precedent to and an entailment
of both. In the absence of such an entitlement, neither our physical
existence nor our psychological identities would be secure. Because
it is within this employment relationship, almost to the exclusion of
all others, that we choose how we shall be productive, it seems incontrovertibly vital to the liberal ideal that access to these means by
which our labour is made productive actually be guaranteed.
The logical dependency that holds between a person's economic
security and the capacity to control her own life is (tragically) confirmed in the historical evolution of industrial societies. In the earliest
stages of their development we have strong evidence that in the
absence of some right to labour which would guarantee some minimal
level of economic security, the autonomy of many individuals could
be substantially, if not completely, compromised by and within the
employment relationship.' 6 As Dickens' fictional, but nonetheless
realistic portrayal of Sissy Jupe made all too plain, in the absence
of any entitlement to some level of material well being, the weak and
the powerless could be and were required to labour and live out their
lives under conditions of virtual enslavement. The Factory Acts" which
were first enacted in response to their plight at the turn of the last
century offer confirmatory and more objective evidence of the causal
connection that holds between a person's economic security and the
independence which is required to allow her to control the choices
which are most central to her life. Those early enactments evinced
a clear understanding on the part of the earliest industrial societies
which regarded themselves as being governed by a liberal theory of
law that the employment relationship was a legal construct, a social
artifact which, if not constrained to respect some limits, could effectively undermine the liberty of vast numbers of their members.
Beyond its effect on a person's physical existence and right to
life, the absence of any guarantee of access to the means by which

15. Melden, Are There Any Welfare Rights?, INCOME SuppoRT (Brown, Johnson
& Vernier, eds. 1981).
16. E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1968).
17. B. HUTCHINS & A. HARRISON, A HISTORY OF FACTORY LEGISLATION (1966).
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we make ourselves productive and secure our material well-being could
also jeopardize many, if not all, of the other rights traditionally
assumed to be integral to the liberal theory of law. Quite simply, as
others have already observed, some basic level of economic security,
no less than the integrity of one's physical being, seems essential to
the enjoyment of all of the other rights which are thought integral
to preserving an individual's autonomy. All of our traditional political
and civil liberties are, to a significant extent, premised upon and
derivative of a more basic right to some minimal physical and economic
security. No other rights can be enjoyed if a right to physical and
material security is not guaranteed. 8
Indeed, even if some right to economic security is recognized,
unless it guarantees a substantial level of material well-being, we
realize that our traditional freedoms and liberties, our political, civil
and legal rights, may remain seriously exposed. We concede this in
the distinction we draw between liberty and the worth of liberty. 9
The stratification, according to economic class, of involvenment in our
political processes; the unequal freedoms of speech which flow from
the economic barriers which block access to the modern media of communication; and our disparate capacities to enlist the support of the
most expert agents in the enforcement of our legal rights are but
a few of the more commonplace, contemporary illustrations of the close
connection that exists between a person's economic circumstances and
those entitlements which liberals have traditionally accepted as being
integral to a person's autonomy. Even the right to contract, the legal
authority to engage in acts of private law-making, may be compromised
in the absence of secure economic status. Thus, as we have just
observed in the example of Sissy Jupe, the failure to recognize any
right to economic independence can so affect the process of contract,
that even it can become a threat to virtually every aspect of a person's liberty. In the absence of any right to the means by which one
nourishes, clothes and houses oneself, a person has so little control
over her effective choices that she may be compelled to accept, "agree
to," terms and conditions of employment which virtually enslave her.
So it would seem, both from the logic if its own assumptions
and from the record of its historical and contemporary experience"
that the question is not whether a liberal theory will accommodate
18.

See, e.g., H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS. Chap. 1 (1980).

19. See Daniels, Equal Liberty and the Unequal Worth of Liberty. READING
RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE Blackwell ed. 1975). A. GER.
WIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS.

20.

Discounting life choices to which they cannot realistically aspire, accepting
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some right to economic independence, but rather what form such an
entitlement should take. The issue is not whether some measure of
economic security is integral to the individual's autonomy, but whether
such an entitlement can be cast in a shape which conforms to the
structure which rights have assumed in this particular tradition of law.
It would seem, in the first instance, that rights of the kind we
are considering could not take the form of universal cash grants.
Unless we imagined a society in which the condition of scarcity had
been conquered, it would simply not be feasible to recognize a right
in every individual to a specified level of income. 21 In rights jargon,
such an entitlement could not be universalized. A claim to a
guaranteed level of income would, if asserted by everyone, jeopardize the very existence of the society. In the absence of environments
of abundance, such absolute rights to income, standing by themselves,
could only be provided by interfering with and dominating the life
plans of the others in society who would be obliged to create the
material wealth implied by such claims. In addition, a constitutional
guarantee of income would be seriously incomplete. It would not secure
the conditions which are essential to the development of our natural,
productive capacities. It would not provide access either to the
technological resources and scientific achievements which form the
material base with which we mix our labour or to the social and communal environment which is integral to the realization of most plans
of production. Finally, such rights to a guaranteed income would
legitimate and make paramount the choices of the free rider, and in
so doing would render unequal and subordinate the liberty of the
others in society who would have to sustain her. Such rights would
offend the liberal idea of "neutrality" in which no one is entitled to
claim that intrinsically or by her conception of life, she is superior
to and able to dominate the life choices of others.
invasions of their physical autonomy and involving themselves less than any other
economic group in the regulation of society's affairs all provide strong evidence of
the serious prejudice that may be effected to a-person's autonomy by being economically
insecure. Descriptions of the implications of being poor in contemporary societies which
I have found helpful include, W. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
A. STUDY OF ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY ENGLAND (1966);
M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1963); Briar,
Welfare from Below: Recipients View of the Public Welfare System, 5 CAL. L. REV. 54
(1966); D. Ross, THE WORKING POOR (1981).
21. A comprehensive statement of economic entitlements entailed by liberal
theory would obviously include guarantees of income security for those who, by reason
of incapacity or infirmity, could not work. Because of their extra employment dimension, I have not considered accident compensation and pension policies in the body
of this essay.
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Conceptually, then, a guarantee of a specified level of income
would be incongruous in a liberal Charter of Rights because it would
fundamentally misconceive the meaning and purpose of the liberties
which rights are intended to safeguard. Rather than understanding
liberty as defining the conditions which are essential to the status
that each of us is entitled to claim as equal moral agents and which
thereby constrain the natural freedom of everyone else in society to
respect that independence, the kind of entitlement we are now considering would recognize a freedom in some to make choices and pursue their interests in a way which would substantially interfere with
the like autonomy of others. In Ronald Dworkin's phrase, a right to
income would be premised on an erroneous conception of liberty as
a "license" to do as one chooses oblivious of the impact it may have
on the liberty and inviolate space of others.' By permitting some to
require others to make positive provision for their well-being, the
liberal ideal of equal liberty, or an equal independence from the
ambitions and choices of others, would be sacrificed.
The intrinsic inability of an entitlement like a guaranteed income
to satisfy this condition of universality or reciprocity3 suggests that
any right to economic security in a liberal regime of law would need
to be attached to and form part of a larger right to labour. To avoid
the 'externality' effect of a pure incomes policy, it seems that the
liberal right to the economic security, which is integral to the autonomy
of the individual, would have to make some provisions for occupational
tenure as well as for material well-being. Some formulation of what
we might, for convenience, characterize as a right to work at a decent
income"' seems necessary to ensure that the economic security we
require to control our most basic choices in life can be provided and
22. Dworkin, Liberty and Liberalism, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
23. Apart from their failure to respect the equal liberty of others, rights to
a guaranteed income or to a fair share of a community's wealth, suffer a variety of

other defects which would be fatal for most adherents to the liberal theory of law.

In the first place such entitlements would seem to render its claimants morally depen-

dent upon and vulnerable to the rest of society in a way which would not be true
if they could found their claim to economic security on their having met a moral obligation to work. Becker, The Obligation to Work, 91 ETHICS 35 (1980). Only in the latter
case, where income and labour are joined would an individual enjoy the moral independence, so central to the whole thrust of the liberal tradition, of having provided

for herself.
Beyond these fatal weaknesses, for liberals who are also efficiency buffs, rights
to guaranteed incomes or fair shares stimulate adverse incentives that seriously prejudice their attractiveness compared to the rights of economic well-being which at-

tach to the employment relationship.
24. In addition to conditions of income and tenure such a right would of
necessity also include other factors such as a safe and healthy work environment which
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made available equally to everyone in the society. Integrating the
requisite economic security in a right to work seems to respect the
basic independence each of us is entitled to assert as equal moral
agents. By guaranteeing access to the means by which our labour is
made productive, each individual could enjoy the conditions essential
to her autonomy in a way which respects the equal autonomy of others.
But even if a right to labour at a decent income could satisfy
the condition of universality or neutrality in a way which a right to
a guaranteed income could not, it still might be argued by those who
subscribe to the more classical formulations of liberal theory (or one
of their contemporary offspring), that such an entitlement would
require society to act in a way which exceeded the "negative" obligations to which liberal rights, on their interpretations, are thought to
give rise.25
Now in liberal theory, no less than in other legal systems, rights
are a distinct legal concept with quite discrete characteristics of their
own. Having a right in the liberal tradition of law is to have a legal
entitlement of a specific and definite kind. Much has been written
about the various characteristics which distinguish rights from other
legal forms but the feature which has traditionally been regarded as
the most germane to and troublesome for a discussion of economic
rights lies in the "positive" obligations to which such entitlements
are said to give rise. In liberal theory, rights correlate to duties and
to duties of a particular kind. Broadly, the recognition of a right is
said to carry with it a correlative obligation on the part of everyone
else in the society to respect that right. There is a duty on the part
of each of us not to interfere with the freedom or liberty which is
entailed by that entitlement. And that is the extent of our duty.
In liberal theory, or at least in its most traditional versions, the
idea is that in securing the conditions which are essential to safeguard
the autonomy of the individual, rights may only give rise to duties
which require the rest of the society to refrain from behavior which
would otherwise interfere with those liberties. Liberal rights correlate
to duties to refrain from acting in the prescribed ways; they are said
not to give rise to an affirmative duty to act and/or to provide. Thus,
my duties which would correspond with your freedom of speech or
thought are said to involve an obligation on my part (and the rest
of society) not to encroach upon or interfere with you in your exercise of those entitlements. My duty precludes me, for example, from
are equally integral to the physical well-being of the individual. For convenience in
this essay I shall simply assume that security of tenure refers to a job which is not
dangerous to one's health or safety.
25. A. GUTTMAN, supra note 1.
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physically obstructing the peaceful expression of your views or from
requiring you to espouse or refrain from espousing a particular set
of beliefs. By contrast, your liberal rights to the independence of your
speech and thought can never require me to provide you with the
means by which those freedoms might be enhanced and made even
more worthwhile. It is because liberal rights, and the duties to which
they correlate, are purely negative that it is said I am not obliged
to allocate to you a prime-time television channel or a particularly
stimulating ocean-side study - nonwithstanding that you could easily
establish that they would enhance, respectively, the worth of the liberty of your speech and your thought.
For these liberals, the idea that rights only give rise to duties
to refrain from behavior which would impinge on the independence
of others seems to follow directly from the basic ethical starting point
of their theory. In their view, if everyone in the liberal society adhered
to their obligations and organized their behavior so as to respect the
rights of others, everyone would enjoy, equally, the space which was
essential to their personal autonomy. Discharging one's negative duties
seems to be a sufficient condition to ensure the environment in which
the moral premise of liberalism would be secure and could thrive. If,
as liberals believe, rights are recognized so as to guarantee that every
individual will have an equal space within which she may autonomously
control and pursue her interests in life, then simply by respecting
those boundaries, by restraining our inclinations to invade the territory of others, we can guarantee the liberal ideal of our equality
as moral agents. By everyone equally, but minimally, constraining their
own choices and pursuits in life, the ethical end point of the theory,
the equal autonomy of each of us can be secured.
Now it would be hard to deny that a right to economic security,
which was attached to work, would require some affirmative commitment on the part of the rest of society for its realization. Even rooted
in a labour relationship, a right to economic liberty could still be
expected to require society to provide opportunities and create
institutions in which such an entitlement could be realized. Even if
it could be characterized as being universal, it might still be argued
such a right to work at a decent income was inherently positive in
character.
While it possesses an initial plausibility, the weakness in such
an argument lies in its assumption that any 'positive' characteristic
that can be identified in a putative entitlement would disqualify it
from the liberal tradition. Its challenge is predicated on a dichotomy
between positive and negative rights which is not nearly as sharp
as the argument suggests. In fact, this 'positive' aspect, which is
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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implicit even in our traditional political and civil rights, does not alter
the essentially negative form in which such a right to work would
be cast. The allocation of resources necessary to implement or enforce
such an entitlement would not interfere with the equality of our liberty
any more than it would when directed to the realization of our traditional political and civil rights.
This matter can be approached in either of two ways. On the
one hand, we can establish the compatibility of a right to work with
even the most cautious versions of the liberal tradition by identifying 'positive' attributes which are part and parcel of all rights which
have been recognized by this theory of law. Thus we can observe
that because no right or freedom is self-enforcing, not even our traditional rights and liberties to be free from physical or mental coercion, it is entirely misleading to assume or to assert that liberal
entitlements only give rise to negative duties to refrain from certain
kinds of behavior. In truth even these traditional rights require the
members of a liberal society, acting collectively, to allocate significant social resources to ensure that whatever condition or liberty is
protected by the right is actually enjoyed by its members. At a
minimum even our most fundamental rights and freedoms possess
a 'positive' character to the extent they oblige the liberal society to
put in place a set of policing and judicial institutions which can ensure such rights are respected and ultimately vindicated in the event
they are transgressed. From this perspective, the legislative responsibility which would derive from the entrenchment of a right to work
at a decent income would entail the establishment of institutions and
programmes of enforcement which would parallel the police, penal and
judicial institutions which we create to enforce our traditional political
and civil rights. Just as the construction of penal institutions is an
obvious way of deterring those who would otherwise be inclined to
invade our liberty, so, to require that equal work and employment opportunities be established seems the most efficacious method of
responding to those who would, by the rules of social cooperation that
they would sanction in the legislative process, deny others the space
and resources which are required for their independence.
However, the distinction that may be thought to exist between
26. Indeed, beyond the resources which are expended to ensure compliance
with and enforcement of our most traditional freedom, as liberal societies have evolved they have come to understand the necessity of comitting substantial social resources
to an elaborate set of policies which provide for legal aid, election expenses, and some
equality of access to the modern media of communications in order to enhance and
make secure the equality of our freedoms of speech and political participation.
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our traditional freedoms and economic rights is not only blurred by
the realization that all rights and liberties require some positive
expenditure of social resources on the part of society in order to
enforce them. In addition, on closer scrutiny, one perceives that the
duties which correlate to economic entitlements, or at least a right
to work at a decent income, are themselves essentially negative in
character. No less than our traditional political and civil rights, a right
to work at a decent income seems most accurately described as
requiring for its realization, primarily, that everyone refrain from
behavior which would otherwise interfere with the liberty of others.
Specifically, the most fundamental obligation which seems to correlate
with such an entitlement is the 'negative' commitment from everyone
to refrain from using society's legislative processes to impose social
institutions, such as property or employment laws, that would regulate
the labour relationship in a way which interfered with the equal liberty
of others. Given the necessity of society choosing some system by
which to organize its productive resources,' the most basic duty to
which a right of the kind we are now considering could be said to
give rise, would be the obligation to avoid erecting a legal structure
which is at odds with the basic ethical premise which motivates this
theory of law. Thus, to revert to an example we have considered
above, the obligation which would correlate to a right to work at a
decent income would require members of a liberal society to renounce
a purely private, contractual process by which to settle its law of
employment. Left to its own we have already observed how that legal
institution, no less forcefully than physical abuse, can be hostile to,
and ultimately destructive of, the liberty and autonomy of others."
So described, the economic entitlement we are now considering
could be seen, at its core, to be a right to procedural fairness in the
institutions in which these (occupational, economic) conditions of liberty
and individual autonomy were defined. Rather than a right against
any particular person, a liberal right to work at a decent income would
be a claim against the society as a whole and to social institutions
and processes of law-making which would enforce these conditions of
liberty as fairly and as equally as the society's economic resources
would allow. Cast again in terms of the duty that would correlate
27. As Karl Renner, the Austrian legal scholar, said:
"No society has yet existed without a regulation of labour peculiar to
it, the regulation of labour being as essential for every society as the
digestive tract [is] for the animal organism."
K. RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTION 115 (1949).
28. Beatty, Labour is not a Commodity, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (Swan &

Reiter, eds. 1978).
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to such a right, it would be the obligation of every member of a liberal
society (and particularly when joining organizations primarily concerned with matters of labour relations, e.g. trade unions) to advocate
and work towards establishing institutions which would settle the
substantive law of labour relations according to procedural principles
so pure that they would ensure (so far as it is possible) that their
legislative output, and particularly the rules pertaining to a person's
security of tenure and income, would be legislatively just.
Characterizing the right to work at a decent income as being,
ultimately, a right to procedural fairness in the processes by which
such conditions of liberty are settled, brings us back full circle to our
discussion of the techniques of legislative justice that have traditionally
been relied upon in liberal regimes of law. At a minimum, it suggests
that the legal processes by which the law of labour relations, including
the central matters of security of tenure and income, is enacted must
conform to the procedural principles we require of all democratic
institutions. Translated into the terms we considered in the last section, it would mean that a liberal law of labour relations would
emphasize the individual's independence from and participation within
the processes which defined, in substantive terms, those conditions
which are essential to that person's most basic aspirations as a producer. Like the public law-making processes with which we are most
familiar, a liberal law of labour relations would be highlighted by a
set of entitlements which ensured equal participation within, as well
as equal respect from, the institutions through which society settled
upon these basic conditions of liberty.
Paralleling our traditional civil and political liberties, to respect
our moral equality as autonomous persons, limits and rules which
govern the liberty of the individual to be productive would themselves
be premised upon this common aspect of our humanity rather than
on how much property (real, personal or genetic) we possess or on
how valuable the marginai product of our labour is. By ensuring that
the principles which govern the local, private processes of making
the law of employment (e.g., collective bargaining) are themselves sensitive to and respectful of this equality of personhood (are, in Rawlsian terms procedurally pure) we could be confident that the resulting
terms and conditions of employment, which define the details of
economic security, would be equally protective of the autonomy of
everyone.
Of course, the substantive content of the principles of procedural
justice which define a liberal law of labour relations and its central
principle of a right to work at a decent income, would not be precisely the same as those which characterize our existing democratic
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/3
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law-making institutions. Necessarily, the limits which would constrain
the subordinate law-making processes by which the terms and conditions of economic security are actually settled would, in substance,
relate to economic matters of occupational tenure and material wellbeing rather than to the security of our physical persons or private
thoughts. But in structure and in its principles of participation, the
analogy seems valid. Thus, like our most general constitutional procedures and theories of legislative legitimacy, one would expect a right
to work at a decent income, in particular, and a liberal law of labour
relationships, in general, to be hierarchical in structure. The principles
pertaining to security of income and employment, such as minimum
wage legislation, which would act as constraints on the local subordinate law-making institutions (such as contract or collective bargaining), would themselves be the product of independent and more senior
legislative institutions. Like our civil and legal rights, these conditions of minimal economic security would serve to protect against the
tyranny which is the potential of all legislative processes, however
local or private they may be.' Standards of employment pertaining
to discharge, lay-off, retirement, minimum wages, pensions, etc., which
would establish and guarantee the pre-conditions necessary for an individual to remain in control of her life, would serve as the framework,
the constitutional limits as it were, to which the local law-making institutions would have to conform.
Within that framework more local and personal law-making
institutions (contract, collective bargaining, etc.), would settle the
actual details of economic well-being to be enjoyed by each individual.
Within these subordinate "private" legal processes, one would expect
the rules of participation to conform in all material respects with those
which characterize all of our democratic institutions which have the
potential and the power to encroach unequally on the liberty of those
whose lives they regulate. In our own societies, the rules under which
individuals would participate to settle the terms and conditions by
which each exercises the liberty to the productive, would be expected
to conform to the principle of one person-one vote. Regardless of how
superior she believed herself to be, or how much more significant she
thought her plan was, no one would be able to assert that she should
count for more than others in the process by which the terms of her
occupational ambitions and economic security were fixed. It would not
be consistent with the liberal postulate for this subordinate legal
institution to exclude some individuals from participating in the resolution of the material well-being which most of us derive from our labour
relationships. Such an institution could not tolerate a principle by
29.

Supra, note 2.
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which some, but not all, could participate in settling the rules on which
individuals could be laid-off or discharged or retired. To the contrary,
on the liberal premise that each of us is an equal moral agent, the
relevant characteristic for participation in the law-making institutions
which defines our productive liberty would be personhood, and the
distributive principle which conforms with that feature is equality.
In this respect, as in its overall, multi-tiered structure, the liberal
law of labour relations and the right to economic security to which
it would give rise, would mirror closely the principles and techniques
of procedural fairness which govern our most general legislative
procedures.
IV. THE ROUTE TO A LIBERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY?
If, as I have argued, it can be established that a right to work
at a decent income would be a central constitutional principle in a
society which professed to be governed by a liberal theory of law,
and that such a right would, consistent with the traditional structure
and methodology of that theory, be essentially procedural or institutional in form, then we are now in a position to move on to the
ultimate objective of this essay and assess the strength of our own
commitment to the liberal ideal. We have in hand the tools which
will allow us to explore, at each stage of the employment relationship, the principles and processes embodied in the various pieces of
labour legislation we have enacted and to determine to what extent
we have satisfied our collective responsibility to organize our social
system in a way which respects the right of every member of our
society to the conditions on which their liberty depends. Such an
analysis will also enable us to anticipate the alternate policy choices
available to ensure that the legal institutions which we erect to house
our work relationships conform as closely as they can to the liberal
mould.
Certainly both in the structure and subject matter of our law
of employment it is not difficult to spot the influence of the liberal
theory. Even a casual perusal of those laws reveals the broad division which we earlier identified as being characteristic of the liberal
method of social justice; between on the one hand, standards legislation, touching a variety of incidents of economic and occupational
security and, on the other, procedural rules intended to ensure that
individuals can participate more equally in the private, local lawmaking processes where the detailed terms and conditions under which
they must labour are settled. Thus, in the laws which prohibit
discrimination in the hiring and employment of persons, stipulate
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/3
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minimum wages and maximum hours of work, establish minimum
periods of maternity leave, kequire the health and safety of employees
to be protected, promote the sharing of available work, and guarantee
that no one may be dismissed without just cause, all of which are
now recognized to varying degrees in Canadian if not American labour
legislation, we can identify a set of equal entitlements available to
virtually' all workers. These do provide some measure of security
of occupation and income which, as we have observed, would be
integral to any right to work at a decent income as recognized by
a liberal theory of law. Moreover, as laws of general application, they
envelop and constrain the outcomes of the private, local law-making
processes in a hierarchical structure which parallels the relationship
we identified earlier in liberal theory between rights and public
expressions of the legislative will. In the same way that rights limit
the authority of the legislature to interfere with our autonomy and
liberty, these pieces of standards legislation impose constraints on the
outcomes which are permissible in the local, private law-making
processes of collective bargaining and contract. Concurrently, collective bargaining statutes can be viewed-and indeed are justified by
supporters-as an attempt to enfranchise those workers who, like
Sissy Jupe, are unable to participate meaningfully in the ordering and
regulation of their (working) lives through a process of private contract. Collective bargaining, like universal suffrage, is intended to be
a legal instrument through which individuals may participate more
nearly as equals in the governance of their (working) lives.
But while the influence of the liberal theory and method of
legislative justice can, not surprisingly, be seen to have permeated
the system of employment laws we have erected to govern our working relationships, on closer scrutiny it is startling to see, in substantive terms, how seriously imperfect and incomplete our commitment
to the liberal ideal really is. At each stage of the employment relationship, the laws we have brought forth to regulate our interaction
as consumers and producers fall short of the institutions and principles which would be required to enforce, and thereby respect the
conditions an individual requires to remain independent and
autonomous. In some fundamental respects, the basic legal regime we
have enacted to govern an individual's entry to, involvement within
and termination from an employment relationship seems to undermine
30.

It is not uncommon for standards legislation to deny certain occupational

groups the benefits of their terms. Two groups which seem most consistently prejudiced by such discrimination are domestic and agricultural workers. Employment
Standards Act, 137 Ont. Rev. Stat. (1980); and in particular Ont. Rev. Regs. S 283, 284

(1980).
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the promise of equality of liberty which drives the liberals' definition
of legislative justice. At each phase of the employment relationship,
an agenda of reform to secure that equality confronts the legislator
who takes seriously her responsibility to fashion rules of social
cooperation in accordance with the liberal theory of law.
Curiously, given how relatively late in the day the issue seems
to have come to our attention, it is at the hiring state where, as a
society, we seem to have come closest to putting in place laws which
reflect and give effect to the idea which underlies the equal right
of every person in the community to work at a decent income. Recognition of our equality as self-interested, self-governing choosers of the
ways we shall act out our lives seems, at a minimum, to entail a commitment to equalizing access to the means by which those choices
can be realized. It is not surprising then, that in all jurisdictions it
is now unlawful for any person-property owner or otherwise- to
deny another an opportunity to work because of any of a long list
of (prohibited) reasons which, with some notable exception31 is quite
exhaustive. Human rights and employment standards legislation
guaranteeing individuals an equal opportunity to be considered for
a vacancy only on factors or criteria relevant to the nature of the
position seem to be the most obvious, simplest and most straightforward derivation of legislative policy from the principle that we
have a social obligation to respect a right in all members of the society
to work at a decent income. It is perhaps to be expected then that
(ultimately) our commitment to liberal theory seems the strongest at
this entry phase of the employment relationship. Ironically, it is
perhaps to our embarrassment that recognition of the principle of nondiscrimination, of equal opportunity employment, came so late in the
day which explains why, in a rush of confused enthusiasm to right
past wrongs, we have sanctioned a set of policies, known colloquially
and constitutionally as affirmative action programmes, some aspects
of which seem positively hostile to the liberal ideal. Laws which sanction strong affirmative action, in the sense that it is permissible for
one individual to be selected for employment over another, all other
things being equal, simply in virtue of sex, race, ethnic origin,
residence, etc., do not seem to fit comfortably with the liberal idea
of neutrality. Except in those cases where past privations may have
precluded a fair competition for available opportunities by particular
31. Sexual orientation is perhaps the most publicized ground on which it is
not unlawful to discriminate between individuals in the distribution of work opportunities. In some jurisdictions equality is achieved by an omnibus provision which prohibits discrimination in hiring or employment on any ground not relevant to the job.
British Columbia Human Rights Code, 186 Brit. Col. Rev. Stat. S 8 (1979).
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members of a discriminated group, 2 strong affirmative action programmes which are contemplated and sanctioned in human rights
legislation, seem to offend the liberal ideal of treating neutrally, viz.
equally, the freedom of every individual to choose and pursue the
opportunities most central to their lives. In liberal theory, discrimination in hiring, in the sense of distributing work opportunities on
criteria and factors not relevant to the job, seems to offend the commitment to equality of liberty regardless of whether the direction in
which it is practiced is forward or reverse. Unless jobs are stipulated
to serve social purposes independent of providing access to the means
by which an individual's labour is made productive and autonomy is
secured, such programmes seem to undermine the idea of equality
implicit in the right to work at a decent income.
While the apparent divergence between our laws of hiring and
the liberal ideal of equality of liberty might be explained as an overly
enthusiastic, if ultimately a wrongheaded, attempt to right earlier
lapses in our commitment to the liberal principles of justice, no similar
account can be made for the employment laws which our legislatures
have enacted to govern the interaction of individuals once they are
employed. Both standards legislation, which defines the minimum
terms on which individuals can work, and the collective bargaining
statutes which specify the (legislative) processes by which the particular rules and regulations of each work place are settled, seem to
reflect deliberate choices on our part to stop well short of the
requirements of liberal theory. Both of these legal instruments do far
too little, rather than too much, in translating the ideal of equality
of liberty into the rules which actually govern our work communities.
The standards we have generally adopted to ensure that all workers
have an adequate and fair level of material well-being provide the
most obvious example of the gap between our laws which regulate
the activity of work and the liberal ideal. For example, minimum wage
laws, which are not universal in scope and which guarantee levels
of income close to or even below the generally accepted definitions
of poverty do not provide an environment in which significant choices
of personal lifestyle and ambition, let alone options to participate in
the governance of the community, can meaningfully be contemplated.
Similarly, public standards which guarantee equal pay for equal work
are notorious for their tolerance and protection of occupational ghettos
in which inequalities in the well-being and renumeration of individuals
are predicated on factors as irrelevant and (in this context) as invidious
as sex.
32.

Sher. Justifying Reverse Discriminationin Employment, 4 PHILOSOPHY AND

PUBLIC AFFAIRS 160 (1980).
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Standards legislation, such as the above, may provide the most
dramatic illustrations of our failure to respect the principle of an equal
right of every member in our society to work at a decent income.
However, it is the contemporary collective bargaining models upon
which we rely to flesh out the detailed terms and conditions of employment in the work place, which seem most inconsistent with and prejudicial to the equality that liberals insist holds among individuals.
In essence, as I have described in an earlier essays collective bargaining rejects as the relevant criterion for defining the rules of participation in the processes which settle the law of employment, the fact
that each individual, as a moral agent, has an equal concern in her
autonomy and therefore an equal interest in involving herself in formulating the rules within which she must pursue her choices. To the
contrary, in collective bargaining, what counts as the currency of participation is what kind of person you are, or, more accurately, were
born to be. What counts, and counts profoundly, are the social circumstances in which one is born, the inheritance of a particular
economic status34 and the locational 5 or occupational setting in which
one exerts one's labour. It is those factors, and in particular the
endowments which one inherits, rather than the equality of our
personhood, which, in the processes of individual and collective
bargaining, are made the relevant bases on which participation in the
legislative institutions of employment are determined. By organizing
and channelling an individual's participation into groups, into "bargaining units" which recognize and indeed are defined against distinctions
in our occupational identities and in the endowments we have
inherited," the process of law-making by collective bargaining ensures
that involvement on a whole range of issues essential to our economic
security and ultimately to our autonomy as moral agents will be
stratified and highly unequal. Issues of hiring and firing, work
assignments, election of supervisors, technological change and the layoffs they cause, wages, supplemental health and welfare benefits, and
pensions are all settled in a legislative process in which those who
are already the most privileged in their genetic and hereditary inheritances and in their occupational and industrial location have the
most say.
Segregated into discrete, highly decentralized institutions of lawmaking (bargaining units) which are drawn against what are in vital
respects highly arbitrary features of their birthright, doctors, univer33.

Beatty, Ideology, Politics and Unionism, STUDIFS INLABOUR LAW, (Swan and

Swinton eds. 1983).
34.

J. A. BRITTAIN, THE INHERITANCE OF ECONOMIC STATUS (1977).

35. Supra, note 33.
36. Supra, note 33.
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sity faculty (and some times librarians) and engineers can and do participate in the processes of settling the terms of those economic preconditions to their liberty and autonomy in a way which is quite
literally beyond the competence of their fellow workers who toil as
orderlies, cleaners, and support technicians. In a manner which is
characteristic of all market, nondemocratic institutions, whether
individualized or collectivized, our own model of labour relations, in
its rules of participation, invoke a principle of weighted voting in which
individuals are enfranchised according to the value of their economic
inheritance, rather than by virtue of their equality as moral agents.
As I have earlier summarized the essential ingredients of this theory,
Native abilities, parental instruction, tangible and intangible
inheritances, the natural inequalities which are assumed
away in moral theory, become crucial in determining
whether an individual will be successful in securing rights
which are distributed by the market. In this sense, like the
feudal model which preceded it, a market system of allocation of labour represents, ultimately, a system of rights
founded on birthright. Just as feudal law and custom determined that a person's status and identity were wholly fixed
by the class into which he was born, now the theory of the
labour market, expressed in our common law of employment,
ensures that our natural endowments, bequeathed at birth
and developed in the early, formative years will indelibly
affect the fundamental rights that each of us will acquire
to realize our own life plans. In such a system it is to the
best and the brightest, the strong and the powerful that
the market will distribute such rights of participation and
development. Contrariwise, for those whose skills are in
common supply and for whom employment is the only
institutional setting in which they can make use of their
property, the market proves miserly in its distribution of
these rights."
Moreover, it is not just the case that collective bargaining models
fail to treat individuals as equals in their ability to participate in the
decision making processes which generate the rules and regulations
which govern their (working) lives. On the contrary, there is a whole
range of issues on which, for all but the most elite workers, collective bargaining is unable to ensure any participation at all. Grounding rights of participation on the economic determinants of a group's
bargaining power has meant that there exists a whole set of planning
37.

Supra, note 28.
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issues, pertaining to prices, products and investments, which is commonly accepted as being an inviolable part of management's
prerogatives and on which virtually no employee is able to assert her
interest. In terms of public law, it is as if we have gone back to colonial
times for our principles of decision making in our employment relationships and invoked a theory of responsible government in which
the legislatures and their electorate are obliged to defer to some elite
or ruling compact on a range of issues as basic as the very definition
of membership in the workplace. As a system of law-making which
sanctions the creation of a managerial class such as exists, with some
notable exceptions' in our work communities, which is neither chosen
by, nor accountable to the persons (employees) they supervise, the
principles of collective bargaining must be seen to be inadequate to
the task of ensuring or enforcing for all workers an equal opportunity
to participate in the institutions and processes which determine the
rules according to which the most basic aspects of their competing
ambitions must be formulated and reconciled.
The institutional afflictions which cause our standards and
collective bargaining legislation to fail to respect the equal right of
every member in a liberal society to work at a decent income suggest an agenda of remedial legislation to repair the breach between
the actual and ideal. To make credible our claim of commitment to
a liberal theory of law as the organizing device of the basic structures of our society, standards would have to be promulgated which
would ensure every individual a level of economic security adequate
to permit meaningful aspirations beyond the most basic patterns of
survival. To respect our commitment to the equality of an individual's
liberty, including political and civil liberties, standards closer to our
average industrial wage rather than poverty-line incomes would seem
to be required." Similarly, if equal pay for work of equal value is
a principle integral to a person's equal right to work at a decent
income' ° then such standards and even more broadly defined principles
of job evaluation' and income distribution (as well as processes such
38. For example, in our universities and professional societies.
39. There would certainly be considerable room for debate about where precisely the floor should be set. One method, which recognizes the relativity of the concept
of poverty, would be to establish a fixed ratio between it and an income ceiling in
the society. Contemporary adherents of the approach, which can be traced back to
the writings of the ancient greeks, include L. THUROW, THE ZERO-sUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBU.
TION AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE (1980) and also Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, 2 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 272 (1981).
40. In the most fundamental sense of that term it would be "indecent," all
other things being equal, to pay work of equal value (however value is defined) at
different rates of pay.
41. For a discussion of the difficulties experienced in Great Britain in im-
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as compulsory arbitration by which such principles may be applied)
would figure prominently in a legislative agenda committed to the
liberal ideal of equality.

Paralleling such alterations in the standards, which, as described,
would act as limits upon the private, local law making processes, fundamental reform of the principles and structures of collective bargaining would also be required to respect the equality which in liberal
theory holds between individuals.43 Bargaining structures and definitions of bargaining units would have to be radically altered and
expanded to allow for much broader, more egalitarian means of participation. Requiring Labour Boards to ignore skill, education,
experience and location in defining bargaining units, to certify bargaining units beyond single enterprises, and to amalgamate or merge
separate units into larger bargaining structures" would enhance the
liberal ideal by ensuring that the individuals would be able to participate more as equals in the formulation of the rules and regulations on which their right to work will be exercised. Additionally,
to ensure that all workers could participate in the resolution of the
full range of issues which materially affect their autonomy as producers, decision making structures and procedures would seem more
appropriately cast in a collegial rather than adversarial mold.
Replicating the rule-making institutions that currently govern our
academic institutions, replacing the managerial exclusion with principles of accountability and responsibility to the persons they govern
would guarantee all employees some (indirect) influence on a range
of personnel and planning issues such as hiring, promotions, production processes, termination and technological change. As we have
observed to date, collective bargaining has proven itself incapable of
providing most employees with anything more than the most
attenuated influence on any of these issues.
So far we have reviewed the inconsistencies that exist between
the laws we have chosen to govern the basis on which individuals
may enter and be involved in a work relationship and the liberal idea
of equality of liberty. We have also sketched in broad, structural terms
plementing a broad,'public scheme of job evaluation, see K. SWAN, Apples and Oranges:
Comparabilityas a Criterion of Interest Arbitration, INTEREST ARBITRATION (J. Weiler,
ed. 1981).
42. Which would make the Australian model a rich and relevant source of
information for our policy makers.
43. For a more comprehensive description of the respects in which our model
of collective bargaining structures see supra, note 27.
44. In British Columbia, the Labour Board has been given some authority
to amalgamate bargaining structures. See Labor Code of British Columbia, 212 Brit.
Col. Rev. Stat. S 57 (1979).
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the sorts of changes which would have to be made to reconcile the
acutal with the ideal. It should not be surprising then, when we turn
to the final stage and examine the principles which govern the circumstances in which such relationships can be terminated, to find current legal principles are amenable to a similar analysis. Indeed, the
most significant difference appears to be that whereas in the law
governing the earlier stages of the employment relationship, misguided
enthusiasm and moral insensitivity may have caused the legislature
to make imperfect policy choices, the inadequacy and failure of our
law of termination to conform to the liberal ideal of justice stems
mainly from an apparent unwillingness to act; from a kind of collective moral indifference to the liberal ideal. While an employment relationship is no longer strictly at will, there is, nevertheless, essentially
no statutory restriction on the termination of employment beyond the
principle of non-discrimination and the payment of limited
compensation.
The moral void which characterizes this aspect of the law governing our employment relationship is virtually absolute. There has been
almost no legislation enacted to constrain and require the private lawmaking processes to respect even the most rudimentary expressions
of the occupational security which we have seen to be so central to
individual autonomy in an industrial society. Thus, the vast majority
of legislatures" have not even provided the occupational security
(which is enjoyed by those having tenure) of immunity from dismissal
in circumstances in which there is no just cause, viz., legitimate reason,
to terminate the relationship. Indeed, even those jurisdictions which
do respect, to this limited extent, the principle of an equal right to
work have failed to extend it to ensure that newly hired employees
have a fair opportunity to demonstrate their suitability for employment in a period of probation. More meaningful concepts of occupational security, (which are recognized by other industrial societies),
such as lifetime employment or the assurance of being transferred
to or trained for suitable, alternate employment," are not even part

of the legislative agenda. Indeed, even legislative initiatives of the
(Humphrey-Hawkins) Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (1976)
sort, in which, at least as it was originally proposed, society at large,
rather than specific (property-owning) individuals, collectively

45. The most notable exception is Canada Labour Code, Can. Rev. Stat.
S 561.5 L-i) (1970) (as amended) in which employees with seniority in excess of one
year are given this entitlement.
46. A concept which, as our experience with one of the entitlement sections
of the Unemployment Insurance Act makes plain, is easily operationalized. See C.
CHOATE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
186 (1982).
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discharges the responsibility which correlates with a commitment to
respect each person's equal right to work, have not stimulated any
legislative conscience to act. No legislature has yet made the obvious
and direct derivation that society itself must accept the responsibility of being the employer of last resort if it is to discharge its obligation to construct a social and economic system in which everyone's
equal right to work is respected. Indeed, on the rare occasions when
a legislature has addressed the issue of occupational tenure, as in the
case of work-sharing arrangements (which seem most in keeping with
the liberal commitment to an equal right to work), its enactments have
been largely experimental, purely voluntary 7 and on occasion positively discouraging. 8
A community which took its commitment to liberal theory
seriously would cause its legislators to enact legislation securing all
of these principles-just cause for termination, work sharing
(including mandatory retirement), responsibility for retraining and
replacement, and in the last resort, guaranteed employment. 9 There
would be no reason, in theory, not to. All of these legislative initiatives
would make secure the economic conditions which are prerequisites
to our autonomy and all of them are well within the liberal's principles of legislative legitimacy. The legislative agenda called for by
such proposals is substantial (particularly when they are added to the
prescriptions which would be required to legitimate our laws governing hiring and involvement within the employment relationship). Many
of the amendments would fundamentally alter the structure of decision making in our enterprises (in effect by democraticizing decision
making in the workplace). However, it is important, in the context
of our earlier discussion about the nature of rights, to observe that
with the exception of the principle of guaranteed employment none
of the required legislative activity by which liberals would collectively
satisfy their obligation to respect the equal (productive) liberty of
everyone in the society would involve expenditures beyond the traditional policing and adjudicating costs (e.g., human rights commissions,
labour and arbitration boards) associated with all of our political, civil,

47.

See, e.g., Unemployment Insurance Act, Can. Rev. Stat. S 537 (U-2) (1970)

(as amended).
48. Constitutional guarantees and Human Rights legislation have rendered
of dubious validity some mandatory retirement schemes which, from the liberal theory
of employment relations, seem to be crude but essentially legitimate applications of
the principle of equality.
49. Principles such as just cause and mandatory retirement make it clear that
a right to work is not an absolute, permanent entitlement. It is a right to an equal
share of available work and not a right to work all the time to the exclusion of others
or in a way which imposes external costs on one's fellow employees.
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and (proposed) property rights. As I earlier argued, even legislation
of the Humphrey-Hawkins sort ought properly to be seen simply as
authorizing the construction of an (appropriate) institution of enforcement to deal with those who refuse, in their control of the legislative
process, to respect the liberty of others. In the same way that we
build institutions of incarceration to protect ourselves against those
who would trespass on our physical integrity, guaranteeing employment seems the appropriate means to safeguard ourselves against
those who might otherwise take away or intrude upon the means and
conditions of our existence. In the same way in which courts can and
do require municipal legislatures to enact educational policies (e.g.,
integration plans) to conform to a constitutional commitment to equal
protection of the laws, so it would be natural and legitimate for them
to exercise a similar supervisory mandate to insist on the integrity
of the legislation we enact to regulate our labour relationships.
Nor can it be argued that such an entitlement in employment
is not a legitimate candidate within a liberal Charter of Rights because
of its encroachment on the property rights of others. While it is
apparent that the entire remedial programme we have surveyed would
entail a substantial constraint on the existing rights of property
holders, as we earlier observed, those latter entitlements must
themselves respect and give way to what, in liberal theory, is the
more fundamental and deeper concern for the equality that holds
between individuals in their liberty, their freedom, to organize their
lives as they best see fit. Rather than undermining the legitimate
claims of property owners, all of the policy prescriptions entailed in
a liberal regime governing entry to, participation within, and termination from, the economic communities where we exercise our labour
would stipulate the conditions on which such rights could themselves
be legitimately recognized. In effect, by ensuring that property rights
would only be entrenched on terms which respected and secured the
conditions on which everyone's autonomy, their liberty, is predicated,
the legislative agenda which is entailed by a right to work would serve
as our recognition and satisfaction of the "Lockean proviso." That is,
it would ensure that "enough and as good" (industrial) property as
is essential to the independence of a person, would in fact be left
over for her. Fully developed, a liberal law of employment and the
constitutional commitment it entails would ensure that any constitutional recognition of rights would, like rights we enjoy over our own
person, respect the conditions which are essential to the liberty, the
autonomy, of everyone else.
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V.

CONCLUSION

In this essay I have endeavored to derive the broad, structural
features of what I have characterized as a liberal law of employment.
The premises common to the liberal tradition of law, and empirical
observation of the central importance of work and employment to the
independence of our existence argue, in my view, for the entrenchment in our constitutional documents of what I have characterized
as a right to work at a decent income. Enshrined in a Charter of
Rights, such an entitlement would give rise (as do all rights in a liberal
theory) to an obligation on the part of society, and particularly those
to whom it delegates authority to enact rules of social interaction, to
create legal institutions, processes, and principles through which such
a right would be enforced.
The impact of such a programme of legislative reform could be
profound. The revisions to our current employment relation legislation that are entailed by the entrenchment of a right to work would
fundamentally narrow the domain in our lives in which property rights
are permitted to constrain the reach of the liberal precepts of equality and justice. The potential exists for a system of employment relations in which each of our competing ambitions as producers is resolved in a process in which fairness and reason, rather than privilege
and combat, prevail. Indeed for some liberals, the expectation would
be that the security and independence that would be achieved in the
democratization of the workplace would stimulate participation in the
social regulation of the community as a whole.' By ensuring that
everyone is secure in the basic conditions essential to controlling their
productive development, industrial democracy could make the active
participation of every person in the general affairs of society, the
equality of our liberty, a distinguishing characteristic of our
communities.
50.
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